In some wireless environments, minimizing the size of messages is paramount due to the resulting significant energy savings. We present CMCC, an authenticated encryption scheme with associated data (AEAD) that is also nonce misuse resistant. The main focus for this work is minimizing ciphertext expansion, especially for short messages including plaintext lengths less than the underlying block cipher length (e.g., 16 bytes). Our work can be viewed as extending the line of work starting with [HR03] to plaintext sizes smaller than the block cipher block length which is a problem posed in [Hal04] . For many existing AEAD schemes, a successful forgery leads directly to a loss of confidentiality. For CMCC, changes to the ciphertext randomize the resulting plaintext, thus forgeries do not necessarily result in a loss of confidentiality which allows us to reduce the length of the authentication tag. For protocols that send short messages, our scheme is similar to Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) for computational overhead but has much smaller expansion. We prove both a misuse resistant authenticated encryption (MRAE) security bound and an authenticated encryption (AE) security bound for CMCC. Our contributions include both stateless and stateful versions which enable minimal sized message numbers using different network related trade-offs.
Introduction
The current paradigm of providing confidentiality and integrity protection for distributed applications through the use of encryption combined with MAC's (Message Authentication Codes) is reasonably efficient for many environments. In particular, for network message sizes that range from several hundred bytes or more, having MAC's that utilize 8-20 bytes is not unduly inefficient. For resource constrained environments, where message lengths are often less than one-hundred bytes, existing MAC's impose a more significant overhead. Since it requires more energy to send longer messages, it is important to reduce message sizes in protocols used by wireless devices. This need becomes even more critical for low bandwidth networks.
A key reason that MAC's need to be long is that the most popular symmetric block cipher modes can be predictively modified by an attacker. Counter mode (CTR) can be modified by flipping bits so the attacker can precisely control the changes to the message. Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) can be modified such that changes to one block are predictable while the preceding block is randomized (see [Bellovin] for attacks that utilize this property). Also, the most common schemes for CCA (Chosen Ciphertext Attack) security utilize a CPA (Chosen Plaintext Attack) encryption scheme combined with a MAC (Message Authentication Code) [DolvDwkNaor] .
Definitions for Authenticated Encryption (AE)
We give motivation for our definition of authenticated encryption.
Consider OCB or a counter mode variant (e.g., GCM) with a 4 byte authentication tag. Then for the AE security game, submit the message (plaintext) with all 1's and also the message with all 0's. The adversary obtains a ciphertext response corresponding to one of the plaintexts. Then randomly flip bits in this ciphertext for each new ciphertext query and attach a random authentication tag. Then the probability of winning is q(2 −32 ). The reason is that this bound is the probability that one of the submitted ciphertexts is valid. If it's valid then we get the plaintext back which shows us the bits that we flipped. And if the flipped bits are zero, then the original message had all 1's and vice versa. Now compare this to CMCC with a 4 byte zero bit authentication string. Then our AE security bound is approximately q(q − 1)(2 −65 ) for a 12 byte message. Thus CMCC has stronger AE security given a short authentication tag. If we run the same attack against CMCC as in the preceding paragraph, then the probability of a valid ciphertext is approximately the same. But the corresponding plaintext would be randomized with high probability and thus would give us no information about the challenge plaintext.
The MRAE-AE definition in [RogwyShrmptn] does not distinguish between the security levels in the two cases above, but the PRI (Pseudo Random Injection) definition in [RogwyShrmptn] does distinguish them.
This distinction becomes more important given short authentication tags; in particular, classifying a forgery as a a complete loss of security is not always appropriate. Depending on the application, a single forgery may not be enough to disrupt the application (e.g., VoIP), and depending on the encryption scheme, it may be detectable during higher layer protocol checks. Our security definition should be general enough to handle the case of a valid ciphertext query where changes to the ciphertext randomize the resulting plaintext so that the upper layer protocol checks detect and reject the message. (None of our security bounds include any factor related to upper layer protocol checks.)
Our definition gives the Adversary encryption and decryption oracles (real world) vs. a random injection function and its inverse and asks the Adversary to distinguish between the two (see Section 2). This definition is the same as the PRI definition in [RogwyShrmptn] .
Applications
For constructing a secure channel (with both confidentiality and authentication) using our encryption scheme, it follows that we can shorten or eliminate our MAC tag since the adversary cannot make a predictable change to the encrypted message, as in many counter-mode based schemes. (These other schemes depend on the MAC to detect such a change). With our scheme, a change to the packet is highly likely to cause the packet to be rejected due to a failure to satisfy application protocol checks. Another possibility (e.g., Voice over IP (VoIP)) is that the randomized packet will have a minimal effect. With only a small probability can the adversary achieve a successful integrity attack. Since network transmission and reception incurs significant energy utilization, it follows that we can expect to achieve significant energy savings. Our analytical results for wireless sensor networks show that energy utilization is proportional to packet length, and that the cryptographic computational processing impact on energy use is minor.
If we consider VoIP, a 20 byte payload is common. The transport and network layer headers (IP, UDP, and RTP) bring another 40 bytes, but compression [cRTP, Bormann] is used to reduce these fields down to 2-4 bytes. The link layer headers add another 6 bytes. Thus the total packet size is 30 bytes, assuming the UDP checksum of 2 bytes is included. In this case, by omitting the recommended 10 byte authentication tag and using CMCC with 2 bytes of expansion, we obtain a 1/5 savings in message size and corresponding savings in energy utilization. Furthermore if the encryption boundary is just after the CID field (which is used to identify the full headers), then the UDP checksum is encrypted and acts as a 2 byte authentication tag. Even if the adversary was lucky enough to obtain the correct checksum, the resulting Voice payload would be noise, with high probability.
Wireless sensor networks also use short packets [VuranAkyldz] to maximize resource utilization; these packets are often in the range of 10-30 bytes. For the adversary, large numbers of queries are likely to be either impossible or highly anomalous in these constrained low bandwidth networks.
Our Contributions
Our contributions are as follows:
1. We give a new family of private key encryption schemes with minimal ciphertext expansion.
We obtain AE security with a small concrete security bound using only 2-3 bytes of ciphertext expansion, for a full range of message sizes. Our work can be viewed as extending the line of work starting with [HR03] to plaintext sizes smaller than the block cipher block length. Halevi posed this problem in [Hal04] . When message numbers are not reused for CMCC, we obtain a security bound which is dominated by q(q − 1)2 −2τ + 2e(q − 1)/β where β is the minimum of the block length and half the length of the plaintext plus the length of the authentication tag for the minimal length ciphertext, and τ is the bit length of the authentication tag.
2. CMCC is a general purpose misuse resistant authenticated encryption mode. We define security for misuse resistant authenticated encryption and prove a MRAE security bound for CMCC. CMCC has less ciphertext expansion than SIV [RogwyShrmptn] .
3. We give both stateless and stateful versions of our schemes where we minimize message number sizes in both versions. As discussed above, each version enables a different trade-off based on the network and application parameters.
4. We give a rough comparison for CPU overhead, network overhead, and energy consumption between CCM and CMCC, where energy is based on a wireless sensor node, the Mica2Dots platform. CMCC uses less energy since its ciphertext expansion is smaller, while the number of block cipher invocations is similar.
Related Work
There was originally work in the IETF IPsec Working Group on a confidentiality-only mode; the original version of ESP provided confidentiality without integrity protection [Atknsn] . However, [Bellovin] showed that CBC and stream-cipher like constructions were vulnerable to attacks that could be prevented by adding a MAC. Given a message with redundancy, the idea that authenticity can be obtained by enciphering it with a strong pseudorandom permutation goes back to [RogwyBellr] . The authors formally prove a bound on adversary advantage against authenticity which requires that the probability that an arbitrary string decodes to a valid message is low. In [AnBellr] , the authors show that public redundancy is not always sufficient and that private (keyed) redundancy leads to stronger authentication properties. Struik [Struik] presented application requirements and constraints, independently of this work at roughly the same time this work was started.
In [Desai] , Desai gives CCA-secure symmetric encryption algorithms that don't use a MAC and don't provide explicit integrity protection outside of the CCA-security. The most efficient one is UFE which utilizes variable length pseudorandom functions. Its ciphertext expansion is |r| bits where r is a uniform random value; security can be compromised if the same r is used for multiple messages. Since r is uniform random, collisions are likely after 2 |r|/2 messages. The UFE security bound is q(q + 1)/2 |r| . If the adversary can make 2 20 queries, then Theorem 4.5 gives a security bound around 2 −57 for CMCC with a 6 byte authentication string, given a 14 byte message. UFE would require a 13 byte ciphertext expansion to assure the same security level.
Rogaway and Shrimpton introduced misuse resistant authenticated encryption (MRAE) in the seminal paper [RogwyShrmptn] , where they present the MRAE schemes SIV and PTE. SIV includes a MRAE scheme where the expansion includes the block cipher block size (e.g., 16 byte) IV plus the nonce. Thus CMCC is a MRAE scheme with smaller expansion (which is important for short messages), and comparable security for applications that require less than a 16 byte MAC. Some applications can utilize a 4 byte or smaller MAC and meet security requirements. The RFC 5297 specification of SIV has the same number of block cipher invocations as CCM. Our security definition is the same as the PRI security definition in [RogwyShrmptn] .
CMCC uses the same authentication construction as PTE. However, the TES that [RogwyShrmptn] recommends for PTE is not capable of encrypting messages with less than the block size of the underlying block cipher.
Collisions in the IV [RogwyShrmptn] (or random message number in [Desai] ) will result in loss of privacy for the affected messages. Thus security is increased if the IV is long (e.g., 16 bytes for SIV). In other words, decreasing ciphertext expansion results in less security. Security for our scheme increases as message length grows, so privacy is stronger when ciphertext expansion is minimal, given message lengths between 10 and 32 bytes. The parameter X in our scheme is similar to the σ parameter in [Desai] and to the IV in [RogwyShrmptn] . These last two parameters create ciphertext expansion whereas X does not. Our scheme is targeted at environments where minimizing ciphertext expansion is valuable.
CMC [HR03] is the first of the tweakable enciphering schemes (TES), originally motivated by the problem of disk encryption. CMC sandwiches a masking layer (involving xor and a pass over the message blocks) in between two encryption layers. CMC plaintexts must be a multiple of the block cipher length. EME [HR04] and EME * [Hal04] are improved schemes with the latter able to encrypt any length equal or longer than the block length. Halevi [Hal04] poses the open problem of encrypting short plaintexts with lengths less than the block length.
Naor and Reingold [NR] initiated another approach for constructing a TES: hash-ECB-hash. The schemes here include PEP [CS06b] , TET [Hal07] , HEH [Sarkar] , iHCTR and HOH [Sarkar] . The hashing layers use finite field multiplications so they obtain a performance advantage over the earlier schemes when finite field operations become significantly faster than block cipher operations. A third approach, hash-CTR-hash, is embodied in HCTR [WFW05] and HCH [CS06a] . Shrimpton and Terashima [ShrmptnTrshm] use a 3 round unbalanced Feistel network approach to obtain schemes TCT1 and TCT2 where the latter has BBB (Beyond Birthday Bound) security for longer messages (messages of length ≥ 2n where the underlying blockcipher has length n. Both schemes are STPRP's (Strong Tweakable PRP's, e.g., the adversary may reuse tweaks.)
Since our scheme uses encryption only in the forward direction combined with xor, our construction is able to handle messages of varying lengths including lengths shorter than the underlying block length which is an advantage over CMC and the above schemes. The stateful version of our scheme includes the integration of a minimal sized message number that enables the number of messages previously sent to be hidden. We also require one less block cipher invocation then CMC and EME*. The EME ciphers are more parallelizable.
There is additional work in the area of small domain encryption including [Ristpt] .
Organization
In Section 2, we give basic cryptographic definitions. In Section 3, we present the CMCC authenticated encryption scheme with minimal ciphertext expansion. Section 4 gives the proof that establishes security bounds for CMCC authenticated encryption and misuse resistant authenticated encryption. Section 5 gives our performance analysis and results, including a comparison of energy utilization between CMCC and CCM, for wireless sensor nodes. In Section 6 we draw conclusions.
Definitions

Pseudorandomness
The concatenation of two strings S and T is denoted by S||T, or S, T where there is no danger of confusion. We write w ← W to denote selecting an element w from the set W using the uniform distribution. We write x ← f () to denote assigning the output of the function f , or algorithm f , to x. S C denotes the complement of set S.
Throughout the paper, the adversary is an algorithm which we denote as A.
We follow [GGM86] as explained in [Shoup] for the definition of a pseudo-random function: Let l 1 and l 2 be positive integers, and let F = {h L } L∈K be a family of keyed functions where each function h L maps {0, 1} l 1 into {0, 1} l 2 . Let H l 1 ,l 2 denote the set of functions from {0, 1} l 1 to {0, 1} l 2 .
Given an adversary A which has oracle access to a function in H l 1 ,l 2 or F. The adversary will output a bit and attempt to distinguish between a function uniformly randomly selected from F and a function uniformly randomly selected from H l 1 ,l 2 . We define the PRF-advantage of A to be
where the maximum is over adversaries that submit at mostueries and run in time t. Intuitively, F is pseudo-random if it is hard to distinguish a random function selected from F from a random function selected from H l 1 ,l 2 .
We also define Adv prp F (q, t) in the same manner where the comparison is with a random permutation and F is a family of keyed permutations.
Authenticated Encryption (AE) and Misuse Resistant Authenticated Encryption (MRAE)
Given plaintext (message) set P, associated data set AD, ciphertext set C, key set K, and message number set N . An authenticated encryption scheme (AE) is a tuple Π = (K, E, D) such that
For our security definition, we define the ideal world object as a random injective function. The expansion function is e : N × AD × P → N. The expansion function depends only on the length of its arguments. Let Inj N ,A e (P, C) be the set of injective functions f from N × AD × P into C such that |f (N, A, P )| = |P | + e(N, A, P ).
Let Π = (K, E, D) be an AE with message space P, associated data set AD, message number set N , and expansion e. The AE-advantage of adversary A against Π is
when encryption oracle queries use unique message numbers and A is restricted to askingueries totaling µ blocks in running time t. f −1 (N, A, C) = P if f (N, A, P ) = C and returns ⊥ if no such triple (N, A, P ) exists. We define MRAE-advantage and Adv
analogously except encryption oracle queries are allowed to repeat message numbers. We also define Adv
(A) over all adversaries A that askueries totaling µ blocks in time t. We define Adv
(A) over all adversaries A that askueries totaling µ blocks in time t for the MRAE environment where message numbers may be repeated in encryption oracle queries. We will also consider the case where the game is restricted if the adversary submits a decryption oracle query which returns ⊥; in this case, the adversary will not be allowed to make additional oracle queries prior to its output.
CMCC
In this section, we present CMCC. CMCC includes a stateless version with public message numbers, and a stateful version with private message numbers. The stateless version has full misuse resistance against reuse of the message numbers, whereas the stateful version has resistance as well, but some private message numbers may result in decryption failures if too far outside the decrypt window. 
CMCC Stateless Encryption
We now present CBC-MAC-Counter-CBC (CMCC) mode. CMCC is a general purpose authenticated encryption mode which is misuse resistant and optimized for energy constrained environments.
For stateless version encryption, we initially utilize CBC mode and obtain the value X. Here we utilize EK to create the CBC IV W from the message number M. This prevents the adversary from being able to manipulate M and P 1 in a way that allows collisions in X values to be created. Then we apply a MAC algorithm to W, X and use the result as the IV for a variant of counter mode encryption to encrypt P 1 and obtain X 2 . Note that if the message has length less than or equal to 32 bytes, then the output of the MAC function is xor'd with P 1 to obtain X 2 and additional counter blocks are not needed. Finally we create the other half of the ciphertext, X 1 using CBC mode applied to X 2 and exclusive-or with X.
Notation
We use ⊕ to denote bitwise xor. When we xor two strings with different lengths, the longer string is first truncated to the length of the shorter string. b j is the bit b repeated j times. S j denotes the bit string S repeated j times. Thus (0110) 2 = 01100110. A and B is the logical AND operation on two equal length strings A and B. The notation R 128 = 0 120 10000111 denotes the bit string with 120 zero bits, followed by the bits 1,0,0,0,0,1,1, and 1. x << n denotes the left shift operator (filling vacated bits with zero bits), after shifting the string x by n bits to the left. |S| denotes the length of the string S. B denotes the block length of the underlying block cipher (128 bits for AES). E k denotes encryption using the block cipher and input key k.
LSB j (x) and M SB j (x) denote the j least significant bytes and j most significant bytes of byte string x respectively.
Padding
We will apply the padding scheme from the AES-CMAC algorithm to our mode when CBC encryption is performed. One difference is that we will sometimes need to pad by a full block length (B/8 bytes) 2 and we use the same padding scheme as when the padding is between 1 and B/8 − 1 bytes.
1. Given the CBC encryption key K, and byte strings S 1 and S 2 , where |S 1 | ≤ |S 2 |. We define pad(S 1 ) S 2 as follows:
2. pad length is the number of bits (which is a multiple of 8) needed to bring S 1 up to the length of S 2 and then bring S 1 up to a multiple of the block size. More formally,
where mod values are taken between 1 and B.
3. We define
If pad length = 0, then |S 1 | is a multiple of B; let F be the last block of S 1 . We define pad(S 1 ) S 2 to be S 1 with its last block replaced with F ⊕ K1.
If 1 ≤ pad length ≤ B, then we append the following string to the last (possibly empty) block F of S 1 : 10 pad length−1 . We denote this string asS 1 . pad(S 1 ) S 2 isS 1 with the last B bits of S 1 replaced with F ||10 pad length−1 ⊕ K2.
CMCC Stateful Encryption -Informal Design Intuition for Private Message Numbers
For stateful encryption, the only difference is in how the message numbers are handled: the message number tag is T = LSB IL (EK(i)) for message number i. This follows the description in Section 3.3. We allow the caller to use private message numbers. In this case,
for private message number i where encryption keyK is shared by the communication peers for the block cipher E. If the sender and receiver communication is synchronized, then M doesn't need to be transmitted. Otherwise, we send the least significant 2-3 (IL) bytes of the value M i as described above except we eliminate M i values from the sequence if the least significant IL byte(s) duplicate a previous M j 's least significant IL byte(s) where (γ − j) ≤ 2(window size) + 1 given M i as the γth element in the sequence (after eliminating previous last IL-byte duplicates and M j is the jth element of the resulting sequence). In other words, M i 's that are close together are selected to have distinct least significant byte(s). This does require a small amount of additional computation to compute the sequence of M i values but doesn't require significant additional work over the case where the least significant bytes are allowed to collide (since 2(window size) + 1 will be less than the birthday bound). The window size parameter (w s) controls how much the encryptor and decryptor are allowed to fall out of synchronization.
Private message numbers allow the number of messages previously sent to be hidden and also minimize the number of bytes transmitted on the wire but the scheme is stateful.
CMCC Private Message Numbers
The two communication peers are denoted as the initiator (init) and responder (resp), respectively. There are two channels; one with the initiator as the encryptor and the responder as the decryptor, and the other with the initiator as the decryptor and the responder as the encryptor. We will describe the private message number (stateful) case.
Key Generation
KeysK 1 andK 2 are randomly generated for the pseudorandom permutations EK i i = 1, 2.
, public message number N, and associated data A. CBC(IV, P, Key) is CBC encryption with initialization vector IV, plaintext P, and key Key. M AC(P, Key) is the CMAC MAC algorithm [CMAC] with plaintext P and key Key. pad() is the padding algorithm defined in Section 3.1. EK is the block cipher with keyK. |P | is a multiple of 8. U is obtained from V by zeroing bits 31 and 63 to enable faster addition (prevent carries) [Hrkn] . U +j is integer addition, 1 ≤ j ≤ i. E L 2 (U +i) is truncated to the length of P 1,i+1 . 
public message number N, and associated data A.
Initial State
u init = u resp = 0. init e = init d = resp e = resp d = 0. (init e and init d are part of the initiator state; resp e and resp d are part of the responder state.) IL is the number of bytes that are transmitted to the peer for recovering the message number. w s is initialized to a positive integer. m 1 = 2(w s)+1. Initially the sequences of M values, Seq(init) and Seq(resp) are empty.
Creating the Sequences of Private Message Numbers
Let x be the encryptor, x ∈ {init, resp}. Let v = 1 if x = init, and let v = 2 if x = resp. Let
is the ith element in the sequence Seq(x).
Channel Assumption
The decryption algorithm returns ⊥ if the ciphertext was created using a message number M that was too far out of synchronization. The following assumption guarantees that decryption is successful (i.e., does not output ⊥).
Let y ∈ {init, resp} where y = x. The next ciphertext that is decrypted,
Given the channel assumption, there existsM such that LSB IL (M ) = T, and the algorithm for creating the sequence ensures thatM is unique. 
Proof of Security
We first give some examples illustrating attacks against CMCC. We will then prove a MRAE security bound for CMCC (see Theorem 4.2). A key point is that ciphertext queries that do not return invalid can be used to create new plaintexts that satisfy a relation (see examples below) that is less likely to be satisfied given a random injection. Of course the MRAE security bound is also an AE security bound for CMCC, but we prove a smaller AE security bound in Theorem 4.5.
To give more insight into the best attacks and security properties of CMCC, we utilize the following examples. Example 1: Without the encoding step (for the zero bit authentication tag), CMCC is not MRAE secure (the adversary advantage is large in the MRAE security game). To illustrate this fact, the adversary submits a plaintext query followed by a ciphertext query using the same message number M and value X 2 . Both queries are twice the block length of the underlying block cipher. The adversary can compute X 1 ⊕X 1 = X ⊕X. The adversary then creates two new plaintexts by modifying both P 2 andP 2 so that the two corresponding ciphertexts have equal X values. Note that the two plaintexts have distinct P 1 values (P 11 and P 12 ). The adversary submits both plaintexts along with the message number M and receives the two ciphertexts whose X 2 values xor to P 11 ⊕ P 12 . This relation is only satisfied with probability 1/α for a random injection and thus the adversary advantage is large.
Example 2: Given a collision of X values for two plaintext queries in the MRAE security game (message numbers may be reused). Then the adversary can modify the respective P 2 values to create two new plaintexts such that the corresponding ciphertexts have equal X values. Then the 
, private message number i, and associated data A. State initialization is per the Key Generation, Initial State, and Creating the Sequence of Private Message Numbers subsections above. CBC(IV, P, Key) is CBC encryption with initialization vector IV, plaintext P, and key Key. M AC(P, Key) is the CMAC MAC algorithm [CMAC] with plaintext P and key Key. pad() is the padding algorithm defined in Section 3.1. EK is the block cipher with keyK. |P | is a multiple of 8. U is obtained from V by zeroing bits 31 and 63 to enable faster addition (prevent carries) [Hrkn] . U + l is integer addition, 1 ≤ l ≤ j. E L 2 (U + j) is truncated to the length of P 1,j+1 .
x ∈ {init, resp} and x has created the ciphertext. Let y ∈ {init, resp} where y = x. There exists at most oneM in Seq(x) such that LSB IL (M ) = T and |SeqN adversary can win with high probability as in the preceding example. This attack works even if the zero bit authentication tag is being used. Thus q(q − 1)/2α will be part of the security bound for CMCC MRAE security. Remark: For the stateless scheme, if there is a field in the associated data which is distinct for each message (e.g., sequence number field), then this can be utilized for the message number and the advantage is that no additional bytes for the message number are sent over the network.
We may select c such that
for the block cipher E.
Lemma 4.1 Given the experiment S where adversary A attempts to distinguish between a block cipher E and a random function. We also consider the experiment S : here an adversary B attempts to distinguish between a random function and a first instance of a block cipher for q/2 queries, and then between the random function and a 2nd instance of a block cipher for the remaining q/2 queries (the block cipher is randomly rekeyed for the last q/2 queries). B has an oracle for a random function for the first q/2 queries if and only if it again has an oracle for the random function during the 2nd set of q/2 queries. Then
For the first q/2 queries, we have
where t = t 1 + t 2 . Also,
Theorem 4.2 Let µ be the maximum number of P 1 blocks in a query request or query response. B is the cipher block length. Let β = min{α, 2 B }. Let the CMCC MAC function be CMAC [CMAC] . Let s be the maximum number of CMAC blocks in a query; c 1 is a constant. CMCC encryption (stateless version) is a misuse resistant authenticated encryption scheme with MRAE-advantage bounded by
given that the adversary is restricted toueries, E is the underlying block cipher for CMAC (e.g., AES), α = 2 8m where Len is the byte length of the minimal length query response, m = Len/2 , assuming up to x invalid ciphertexts do not result in session termination, and τ is the number of bits in the authentication tag.
Remark: Intuitively, there are three types of relations that distinguish CMCC from a random injection:
1. For messages where |α| is shorter than the block length, and M =M , we have the relation X 2 ⊕X 2 = P 1 ⊕P 1 with higher probability equal to 1/α + (α − 1)/α 2 for CMCC versus 1/α for the random injection. The reason is that we may have a collision of X values with probability 1/α and if that does not occur, the resulting V values may still be equal in the first log 2 (α) bits.
2. If M =M , X 2 =X 2 , and P 1 =P 1 , then X 1 ⊕X 1 = P 2 ⊕P 2 . The latter occurs with probability 1/β for CMCC but it occurs with probability 1/β 2 for a random injection.
3. For messages such that |X 1 | = block length, M =M , P 2 =P 2 , and P 1 =P 1 , we have the relation X 2 ⊕X 2 = P 1 ⊕P 1 with probability 1/2 B given a random injection, but with probability 0 for CMCC.
Proof: case i: All plaintexts have length less than 2 * B − τ bits: We use a games based proof to establish the bound claim for the theorem. Game G 0 is depicted in Figure 6 . Game G 0 gives the adversary the CMCC encryption and decryption oracles and the adversary's probability of success is equal to the adversary's MRAE-advantage against CMCC.
Game G 1 is the same as game G 0 except we replace the CMAC MAC function with a random function. Now consider an adversary A E,D where E and D are either the game G 0 encrypt and decrypt oracles or the game G 1 encrypt and decrypt oracles. When A submits P , A, N, then X 1 , X 2 is returned and we give the distinguisher D X 2 ⊕ P 1 = F (P, A, N ) where F is either CMAC applied to a function of P, A, N or a random function. When A submits X 1 , X 2 , A, N then P is returned and we give the distinguisher D X 2 ⊕P 1 = F (P, A, N ) where F is either CMAC applied to a function of P, A, N or a random function. When A outputs b, D also outputs b (b ∈ {0, 1}). Then A s probability of success is bounded by the probability bound for any adversary to distinguish CMAC from a random function which is (5s 2 + 1)q 2 /2 B + Adv prp E (sq + 1, t + c 1 sq) [IwataKrswa] where E is the underlying block cipher, e.g., AES, and s is the maximum number of blocks in any query.
Thus
is the same as game G 1 except the block ciphers used in CBC encryption for computing X 1 and X are replaced with random functions. Consider the game H where adversary B distinguishes between the following: 1. A random function 2. A block cipher E K 1 for q/2 queries and then the block cipher is rekeyed (E K 2 ) for the 2nd set of q/2 queries. Denote this as B E K 1 ,E K 2 . By Lemma 4.1, we have
Suppose D is a distinguisher such that D runs in time t, makesueries, and will distinguish between the xor sum of two block cipher encryptions (each block cipher is independently keyed) and the xor sum of two random function invocations. For an adversary A that attempts to distinguish between games G 1 and G 2 , A can submit X 1 ⊕ P 2 to D for each query that A makes. When A outputs a bit b, D outputs the same bit b. Then A s probability of success is bounded by D s probability of success.
Given the adversary B for the game H. At the end of the sequence of queries, B gives the exclusive or sum of queries i and q/2 + i, 1 ≤ i ≤ q/2 to D. D outputs a bit b and B outputs the same bit b. Then
Thus we obtain
Game G 3 is the same as game G 2 except:
1. Initialize is modified: Initially we set QD(N, A) = ∅ for all N, A. QD(N, A) is a subset of the plaintexts.
2. The line: if (U ! = Z) return ⊥; otherwise Q =P ||Z and return PlaintextP , A, N is replaced with: Q is a random string of length |Q| such that the prefix ofQ of length |Q| − τ is in QD (N, A) 
3. If the adversary submits the encryption query P, A, N, then we set QD(N, A) = QD(N, A) ∪ {P }.
Then the advantage of A in distinguishing G 3 and G 2 is bounded by the probability of obtaining a valid response from the decryption oracle. Consider the adversary's optimal strategy for obtaining a valid ciphertext response in game G 2 ; given the ciphertext queryX 1 ,X 2 ,N : case a: The effect of previous queries whereN matches the message number in these previous queries which have distinct X 2 values (X 2 =X 2 ).
Then the probability of a valid response is independent of these previous queries;X is uniform random since the block cipher has been replaced with a random function. Thus the value P 2 will be uniform random, and using only the information from these previous queries, the probability of a valid response is 2 −τ .
case b: The effect of previous queries whereN is distinct from the message number in the previous queries butX 2 matches their X 2 values:
The same argument as in case i applies; using only the information from these previous queries, the probability of a valid response is 2 −τ .
case c: The effect of i previous queries whereN andX 2 are distinct from the message numbers and X 2 values in the previous i queries:
For each previous query, the probability of a match on both of the inputs to the random functions for computing X and X 1 is 2 −2B . Thus the probability of a valid response, using only the information from these previous i queries, is bounded by i/2 2B + 2 −τ .
case d: The effect of i previous queries whereN andX 2 are equal to the message number and X 2 values in all of the i previous queries:
IfP 1 matches P 1 from a previous query, we obtainX 1 ⊕ X 1 =P 2 ⊕ P 2 . Thus the adversary can selectX 1 and P 2 such that the queryX 1 ,X 2 ,N is a valid query. Then, using only the information from these i previous queries, the probability of a valid response is bounded by i/β + 2 −τ .
Thus the optimal adversary strategy is a single plaintext query followed by successive ciphertext queries that match the N and X 2 values from the plaintext query.
The bound for Adversary success, assuming at most x, 1 ≤ x ≤ q, invalid ciphertext queries prior to session termination, is
Game G 4 is the same as game G 3 except the line X = CBC(W, pad(P 1 ) P 2 , L 3 ) ⊕ P 2 , is replaced with X = CBC(W, pad(P 1 ) P 2 , L 3 ) ⊕ P 2 ; if X ∈ set of used X, bad 5 = true and reselect X : X ← set of used X C . If X / ∈ set of used X, set of used X = set of used X ∪ {X}. Then
Game G 5 is depicted in Figure 7 . Then game G 5 and game G 4 are indistinguishable except that collisions are possible in the strings S 2 where C includes S 1 ||S 2 . When such a collision occurs, the games are distinguishable; the bound on collisions is q(q − 1)/2β. It is possible in game G 4 that a ciphertext query that is not invalid will return a plaintext and another encrypt query with a different plaintext returns the same ciphertext. This last sequence is not possible in game G 5 . However, the bound from Game G 3 allows us to assume that no valid ciphertext queries occur.
Thus the bound claimed in the theorem statement holds. case ii: At least some plaintexts have length greater than or equal to 2 * B − τ bits: We note that this case is a suboptimal strategy for the adversary. Here we modify the bound by adding in the q(q − 1)(µ − 1) 2 /2 B+1 and q 2 /2 B+1 terms for counter mode block collisions and padding collisions for plaintexts of different lengths, respectively. The term 2q(2q − 1)/2 B+1 from above is generalized to 2sq(2sq − 1)/2 B+1 .
Remark: (i) We can replace the 2 −τ term in the above theorem with 2 −(τ +γ) where γ quantifies the number of higher level protocol check bits. (ii) We can eliminate the 2 −τ term if |P 2 | ≤ τ.
We now prove a security bound for the CMCC stateless AEAD algorithm; here message numbers are not allowed to be repeated in plaintext queries.
Initialize: Select the CMCC key, using the uniform random distribution. Let Z be the bit string with τ zero bits. bad 4 = bad 5 = f alse. Let set of used X = ∅. Let set of used X 2 = ∅. Lemma 4.3 Let q − 1 ≤ τ. Given the adversary strategy in game G 2 (in the AE game) where the adversary submits a plaintext query P 1 , P 2 , N and obtains the response X 1 , X 2 . The adversary then submits a succession of ciphertext queries of the formX 1 , X 2 , N where the last τ bits ofX 1 are equal to the last τ bits of X 1 . Given the relation
where λ 1 = 1/β + (β − 1)/β 2 .
Proof:
We use induction over the number of queries. If q = 2, we have
Suppose the lemma is valid for k = q − 1. We now prove the k = q case. We have 
1/i! < e which completes the proof.
Lemma 4.4 Let q − 1 ≤ τ. Given the adversary strategy in game G 5 above (except we are in the AE game where message numbers are not allowed to be repeated) where the adversary submits a plaintext query P 1 , P 2 , N and obtains the response X 1 , X 2 . The adversary then submits a succession of ciphertext queries of the formX 1 , X 2 , N where the last τ bits ofX 1 are equal to the last τ bits of X 1 . Then
The probability that (1) is satisfied is bounded below by
Theorem 4.5 Let µ be the maximum number of P 1 blocks in a query request or query response. B is the cipher block length. Let β = min{α, 2 B }. Let the CMCC MAC function be CMAC [CMAC] . Let s be the maximum number of CMAC blocks in a query; c 1 is a constant. CMCC encryption (stateless version) is an authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) scheme with AEadvantage bounded by
given that the adversary is restricted toueries, E is the underlying block cipher for CMAC (e.g., AES), α = 2 8m where Len is the byte length of the minimal length query response, m = Len/2 , and τ > 0 is the number of bits in the authentication tag. We also assume q − 1 ≤ 2 τ .
Proof: case 1: All plaintexts have length less than 2 * B − τ bits: Games G 0 , G 1 , and G 2 are identical to the ones in the proof of the MRAE case above, except that plaintext queries with repeated message numbers N are not allowed. Game G 3 is identical to game G 5 in Theorem 4.2 above, except that plaintext queries with repeated message numbers N are not allowed (see Figure 7 .) For the transition from game G 2 to game G 3 we have two mechanisms for the adversary to distinguish between the two: X 2 ⊕X 2 = P 1 ⊕P 1 , , and X 1 ⊕X 1 = P 2 ⊕P 2 (1) for two distinct queries X 2 , X 1 , N, P 1 , P 2 andX 2 ,X 1 ,N ,P 1 ,P 2 .
We first consider distinguishing between G 2 and G 3 via (1): case a: Here the adversary uses the strategy from Lemma 4.3: the adversary submits a single plaintext query with message number N and receives a response with X 1 and X 2 , followed by ciphertext queries withN = N, andX 2 = X 2 , where the last τ bits forX 1 are equal to the last τ bits of X 1 from the plaintext query. Then we have
where we have applied both Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.4 from above.
case b: Games G 2 and G 3 can also be distinguished if a collision occurs on W ⊕ pad(P 1 ) P 2 and W ⊕ pad(X 2 ) X between 2 distinct plaintext queries in game G 2 which gives a slightly higher probability for the relation X 1 ⊕X 1 = P 2 ⊕P 2 in G 2 versus G 3 . This probability is bounded by q(q + 1)2 −2B−1 . We can ignore the corresponding case where one or both queries are ciphertext queries since the probability would be less. Furthermore, this strategy is sub-optimal compared to the case a strategy above.
case c: Neither of the above two cases: then at least one of the CBC random function replacements get evaluated on a point distinct from the point in any other query. Thus the probability of (1) is the same in both G 2 and G 3 . We now check the adversary's optimal strategy to distinguish between G 2 and G 3 based on
case d: Given two previous valid ciphertext queries with identical X 2 , N, and last τ bits of X 1 values, the adversary may leverage the technique from the examples above to create a new encryption query that will have the same N value and which will match one of the previous query's X value. Then this query response can be used to distinguish between G 2 and G 3 . The adversary advantage is bounded by (1 − 1/β)q(q − 1)2 −2τ −1 .
case e: Given a combination of zero or more plaintext queries and one or more ciphertext queries, with at least two total queries. If we have a match on the last τ bits of X 1 values for some queries as well as a collision on W ⊕ pad(X 2 ) X then the adversary can follow the approach in case d above and distinguish between G 2 and G 3 based on (2) above. Note that the X 2 and N values are distinct across the queries. The probability of such a collision between two queries is at best 2 −B and therefore this strategy is suboptimal.
case f: The new query (eitherX 1 ,X 2 ,N orP 1 ,P 2 ,N ) is such thatN is distinct from the N in previous queries. Then X 2 ⊕X 2 = P 1 ⊕P 1 occurs with the same probability in both G 3 and G 2 sincē N results in a previously unseen point for the domain of the CMAC random function replacement.
case g: The new ciphertext query is such thatX 2 andN match the corresponding values in a set of previous queries: Then the corresponding X values are distinct. So X 2 ⊕X 2 = P 1 ⊕P 1 occurs with the same probability in both G 3 and G 2 . (Here we assume that the last τ bits of the X 1 values are distinct, or alternatively, that all of the previous queries are plaintext queries, to distinguish this case from case d above.)
case h: The new ciphertext query is such thatX 2 is distinct from andN matches the corresponding values in a set of previous queries: Note that only one of the previous queries is a plaintext query whereas the others must be valid ciphertext queries. Then we have a similar scenario as for case a above, and we can apply Lemma 4.3 with the collision bound 2 −τ +1 /β in place of 1/β + (β − 1)/β 2 . Since the latter value is larger, this strategy is suboptimal.
case i: None of the above cases. Then the inputs to the CBC(W ⊕ pad(X 2 ) X ) random function replacement are distinct across all queries. Thus the probability of X 1 ⊕X 1 = X ⊕X is 1/β for any two queries. Also, the above cases are exhaustive for (X, N ) = (X,N ). Thus the probability of (2) is the same in both G 2 and G 3 . case 2: At least some plaintexts have length greater than or equal to 2 * B − τ bits: The case with longer plaintexts/ciphertexts is similar to the Theorem 4.2 case ii above. We note that this case is a suboptimal strategy for the adversary. Here we modify the bound by adding in the q(q − 1)(µ − 1) 2 /2 B+1 and q 2 /2 B+1 terms for counter mode block collisions and padding collisions for plaintexts/ciphertexts of different lengths, respectively. The term 2e(q − 1)/β is generalized to e(q − 1)(2/β + (µ − 1)/2 B+τ −1 ).
Performance Analysis for Wireless Sensor Networks
We discuss and compare performance to other schemes (e.g. CCM [WhitHousFerg] and others) for short messages, including energy utilization. Energy utilization is important for low power constrained devices and we use the measurements from [WanGurEblGupShtz] to make an estimate for energy consumption on wireless sensor platforms. We compare CCM to CMCC for energy utilization.
In [WanGurEblGupShtz] , the authors measure energy utilization for a variety of cryptographic algorithms due to CPU utilization and networking for the Berkeley/Crossbow motes platform, specifically on the Mica2dot sensor platform. Table 2 gives the results from [WanGurEblGupShtz] with respect to AES encryption, message transmission, and message receipt.
Operation
Energy Utilization Energy to transmit one byte 59.2 µJ Energy to receive one byte 28.6 µJ Energy per byte of AES encryption 1.6 µJ including key setup, averaged over messages of 64-1024 bytes A key point, which is not specific to the Mica2dot platform, is that energy utilization for transmitting or receiving a byte from the wireless network is 10-100 times greater than the energy needed per byte of AES encryption processing, for wireless sensor nodes.
We estimate energy utilization for CCM and CMCC based on the number of AES encryption operations (pseudorandom function evaluations) and sizes of messages. The other CPU operations such as exclusive-or are minor usages and not counting them will not affect our results significantly. Table 3 gives the results.
Let R = L/16 , where L is the message length in bytes. For CCM, the number of AES block encryptions is equal to 2R + 2. For CMCC, the number of prf invocations (AES block encryptions) is 4W + 1 = 3W + max{W − 1, 0} + 2 where W = L/32 . The number drops by 1 if we assume precomputation of the message numbers which is likely in the stateful version and possible in the stateless version as well. CCM eliminates R prf invocations with precomputation, so CMCC has an advantage for messages with 32 bytes or less (for number of prf invocations given precomputation), but CCM has an advantage for longer messages. Table 3 assumes (1) that CCM uses the minimal recommended length MAC tag of 8 bytes which increases the length of the message by 8 bytes while CMCC includes the 2 byte message number tag T as described above along with a 2 byte authentication string for a total of 4 bytes (2) that both CCM and CMCC are applied to the full length message which will cause our measurements to favor CCM slightly, 3 and (3) Messages are less than 2 16 bytes so CCM sends a 13 byte nonce Thus we see that energy utilization is proportional to message length. For faster schemes (e.g., OCB, etc.), the more efficient computations will result in an even closer correlation between message length (including the MAC bytes) and energy utilization. The reason is that the main energy use is in the networking, and reducing the computational load will result in a higher percentage of energy use by networking.
We haven't included length fields in either CCM or CMCC as part of the comparison. Including such fields would give results very close to the ones above.
Implementation
We have completed an initial implementation as part of our submission to the Caesar competition for authenticated encryption. Details can be accessed at http://groups.google.com/group/cryptocompetitions.
Conclusions
We have presented CMCC, a scheme providing provably secure misuse resistant authenticated encryption, and it leverages existing modes such as CBC, Counter, and CMAC. The main focus for this work is minimizing ciphertext expansion, especially for short messages including plaintext lengths less than the underlying block cipher length (e.g., 16 bytes). Our work can be viewed as savings regardless of the size of the application layer messages.
extending the line of work starting with [HR03] to plaintext sizes smaller than the block cipher block length which is a problem posed in [Hal04] . Depending on the environment, we obtain security with only 2-3 bytes of ciphertext expansion. Since changes to the ciphertext randomize the plaintext, we can leverage the protocol checks in higher layer protocols as additional authentication bits allowing us to reduce the length of the authentication tag.
We have given a comparison of energy utilization in wireless sensor networks between CMCC and CCM and showed that energy use is proportional to packet length. Thus CMCC can achieve significant energy savings when applied to protocols that send short messages due to its small ciphertext expansion. Our contributions include both stateless and stateful versions which enable minimal sized message numbers using different network related trade-offs.
